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Abstract 13 
In its origins educational neuroscience has started as an endeavor to discuss 14 
implications of neuroscience studies for education. However, it is now on its way to 15 
become a transdisciplinary field, incorporating findings, theoretical frameworks and 16 
methodologies from education, and cognitive and brain sciences. Given the differences and 17 
diversity in the originating disciplines, it has been a challenge for educational neuroscience 18 
to integrate both theoretical and methodological perspective in education and neuroscience 19 
in a coherent way. We present a multi-level framework for educational neuroscience, 20 
which argues for integration of multiple levels of analysis, some originating in brain and 21 
cognitive sciences, others in education, as a roadmap for the future of educational 22 
neuroscience with concrete examples in moral education.  23 
Keywords: educational neuroscience; multi-level theoretical framework; 24 
neuroimaging; meta-analysis; educational intervention; computer simulation 25 
Introduction 26 
Educational neuroscience is a vast and emerging field that incorporates methods 27 
and perspectives from brain and cognitive sciences, learning sciences, and educational 28 
psychology, among others. In its origins educational neuroscience started as an initiative 29 
to discuss implications of neuroscience findings for education. Going back as early as 30 
1970s, these early discussions focused on if it was at all meaningful to interpret 31 
neuroscience findings for education, and if so, for which specific issues and problems in 32 
education neuroscience findings have implications for.  33 
So far, educational neuroscience has been acting as an interdisciplinary platform 34 
where two distinct fields, neuroscience and education, interact. The main theme that 35 
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characterizes the field is the interpretation of neuroscience findings for educational 36 
research and practice, and increasing neuroscience literacy within the education 37 
community to diminish the negative impacts of neuromyths. But as a burgeoning 38 
transdisciplinary field, educational neuroscience is in the process of defining its major 39 
questions, methodologies, and theoretical frameworks, in addition to forming a community 40 
of scientists. As is historically typical of fields that shift from interdisciplinarity to 41 
transdisciplinarity, one challenge it is facing is incorporating the diverse research 42 
methodologies and paradigms from its parent fields such as education, cognitive sciences, 43 
learning sciences, psychology, neuroscience, and many others in an integrated way to 44 
address a unified set of research questions. This requires connecting distinct research 45 
methodologies functioning at different levels of analysis and coming from different 46 
theoretical orientations.  47 
We argue that responding to the challenge of incorporating diverse research 48 
methodologies and levels of analysis is a crucial next step for the burgeoning field of 49 
educational neuroscience. Here we first discuss some of the challenges facing educational 50 
neuroscience, present the levels of analysis traditionally associated with each field, and 51 
discuss the need to connect these levels so that educational neuroscience can emerge as an 52 
established transdisciplinary field with its own unique approach to research that 53 
distinguishes it from other fields of educational and brain sciences. To exemplify how the 54 
multi-level approach presented here applies to educational neuroscience, we present a 55 
research project on development of moral decision making, which involves a series of 56 
studies each targeting a different set of levels of analysis, from classroom interventions to 57 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies. We present how findings, 58 
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knowledge, and insight acquired from each of these studies address a set of central and 59 
unified research questions, allowing a multi-level transdisciplinary conceptualization of 60 
learning and teaching in this domain. Our expectation is that the framework and the case 61 
study presented here will help with responding to concerns about viability of educational 62 
neuroscience as a field. 63 
Criticisms of Educational Neuroscience 64 
Before discussing how to link different levels of analysis in educational 65 
neuroscience, it is important to visit criticisms of educational neuroscience to pinpoint how 66 
the presented approach addresses current issues in the field. Even though discussion on the 67 
implications of brain science for education have been going on for decades [1,2], efforts 68 
that can generally be framed under educational neuroscience (or variably mind, brain and 69 
education) still invoke skepticism. Skeptics point to philosophical and methodological 70 
differences, and lack of clear connections between neuroscience and education. Proponents 71 
are more optimistic and point to domains where brain science findings shifted perspectives 72 
and influenced teaching practice in education (e.g., reading, numerical cognition). In this 73 
section we visit some of the main criticisms of educational neuroscience and discuss the 74 
extent to which these criticisms were addressed. 75 
Twenty years ago in an influential article Bruer [2] argued that bridging 76 
neuroscience and education is a challenge, and that neuroscience findings do not really 77 
have any direct and meaningful implications for education. He presented numerous 78 
examples for how misled excitement about bridging neuroscience and education are 79 
grounded in misinterpretation and simplification of neuroscience findings, including 80 
synaptogenesis, critical periods in development, and beneficial effects of enriched 81 
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environments on synaptic growth in rats. He argued that while it is not possible to directly 82 
bridge neuroscience and education, the two can be linked through mediation of cognitive 83 
psychology. In this approach neuroscience findings can only be meaningful for education 84 
if it goes through an interpretive filter that is cognitive psychology. Even though it has been 85 
20 years since the publication of Bruer’s paper, his criticisms continue to be endorsed in 86 
more recent criticisms. For example Bowers [3,4] argued that it is psychological science 87 
that provides a scientific grounding for education, and neuroscience rarely provides 88 
insights into learning and teaching outside of psychology. In addition, he argued that 89 
behavioral measures are superior to neural measures in characterizing children’s learning 90 
and cognitive processing; for example, when deciding whether remedial instruction should 91 
target underlying deficits or instead focus on development of non-impaired compensatory 92 
skills.  93 
In his response to the criticisms by Bowers, Gabrieli [5] pointed out that, much like 94 
cognitive or affective neuroscience, educational neuroscience is a basic science that 95 
provides mechanistic accounts for functional organization of the brain. Even though 96 
educational neuroscience findings do not directly prescribe strategies to use in the 97 
classroom, there are numerous examples (e.g., reading, mathematics) for how educational 98 
neuroscience research informs mechanisms of learning and cognition in exceptional 99 
children, and provides insights on individual differences. Gabrieli presented a model where 100 
applied research, involving intervention studies, mediates the communication between 101 
basic research and classroom practice, where successful interventions are scaled. Gabrieli 102 
presents examples for how basic research findings on dyslexia, ADHD, autism and other 103 
conditions changed our understanding of the mechanisms underlying these conditions and 104 
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inspired interventions with some promising results. 105 
Howard-Jones et al. [6] separately responded to Bowers’ criticisms. They likened 106 
the relation between neuroscience and education to how molecular biology is related to 107 
drug discovery. While the basic science provides insights about “where to look,” it “does 108 
not prescribe what to do when you get there” (p. 7).  109 
The knowledge about neural correlates of cognition, and how typical and 110 
exceptional groups differ need interpretation through a pedagogical lens to develop 111 
interventions guided by basic research. Only after these interventions are tested through 112 
large-scale implementation studies (which are similar to clinical trials in medicine) do we 113 
have the type of knowledge that is directly applicable to classrooms. In response to Bowers’ 114 
[4] argument that psychological level explanations are more relevant to education than 115 
neuroscience, Howard-Jones et al. pointed out that these two levels do not constitute a 116 
duality since the “neuroscience” in educational neuroscience is almost always a reference 117 
to cognitive neuroscience. Psychological and neural explanations are in fact 118 
complementary, and, like cognitive neuroscience, educational neuroscience integrates 119 
these two levels. 120 
The tension between the two levels of explanations, neural (or more broadly, 121 
biological) and psychological (which actually includes multiple sub-levels such as 122 
behavioral, cognitive, and socio-cultural) often come up in discussions about the goals and 123 
the future of educational neuroscience. Howard-Jones et al. [4] describe the goal of 124 
educational neuroscience as using “multiple levels of description to better understand how 125 
students learn, informed by changes at both behavioral and neuronal levels that are 126 
associated with such learning” (p. 6). However, critics of educational neuroscience point 127 
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to the concerning trend for biological explanations having wide appeal among educators, 128 
often leading to neuromyths or simplistic and misleading interpretations of neuroscience 129 
findings, some of which are used to justify curricular reform [7–9]. Even though there is 130 
considerable enthusiasm in characterizing the interaction between neuroscience and 131 
education as a “two-way street,” suggesting a bi-directional and reciprocal interaction 132 
between the two communities of researchers and practitioners [10,11], Turner [7] argues 133 
that a two-way interaction does not reflect the current reality of educational neuroscience; 134 
instead neuroscience plays a more dominant role and the field is still mostly occupied with 135 
translating neuroscience findings for educational practice. Turner also contends that these 136 
efforts are not as fruitful as it is portrayed by proponents of educational neuroscience due 137 
to methodological incompatibilities (e.g., use of unauthentic and non-contextual tasks, 138 
focus on group of averages instead of individual differences), and the challenges 139 
educationists face in understanding neuroimaging methods, which is necessary in making 140 
sense of the reported findings.  141 
One pitfall of the collaboration between education and neuroscience is the 142 
possibility of biological level explanations taking over the already existing level of 143 
sociocultural, phenomenological, and cognitive explanations. In its journey from the 1950s 144 
cognitivist era to the 21st century, educational research has moved from more reductionist, 145 
post-positivist theories to post-structuralist, situated, and constructivist frameworks. While 146 
doing so, educational research has developed a sensitivity towards the contextual and 147 
situated nature of learning, first-person experiences (phenomenology) of the learners, and 148 
individual differences in learning approaches and predispositions to learning. One of the 149 
concerns with the introduction of a vast new knowledge base provided by neuroscience is 150 
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the potential of narrowing down the levels of explanations in educational theory by over-151 
emphasizing the biological aspects of learning [12], which sometimes stands counter to 152 
more socio-cultural approaches. The long time tensions between contextual vs. 153 
decontextualized, qualitative vs. quantitative, and ungeneralizable vs. generalizable in 154 
educational research [13] are re-instantiated with educational neuroscience. Part of the 155 
educational research and practice community sees the introduction of neuroscience in 156 
education as an invasion of biological reductionism. Thus, it is necessary to theorize about 157 
how educational neuroscience will function as a multi-level enterprise; one that does not 158 
only retain the levels of explanation that are deployed in neuroscience, but also finds ways 159 
of incorporating the levels of explanation that is established in education. Apart from 160 
theoretical differences and differences in philosophical assumptions about the nature of 161 
learning in different traditions, there is also a methodological divide between neuroscience 162 
and education. Educational neuroscience, being the synthesis of these two fields, needs to 163 
find ways of developing theoretical frameworks that can accommodate these different 164 
research methodologies.  165 
On one hand, neuroscience research, apart from neuropsychological case studies, 166 
seeks to construct generalizable knowledge on mechanisms of learning, cognition, and 167 
affect by way of using randomized trials from random samples. On the other, educational 168 
research mostly targets studying learning in context and developing better educational 169 
systems. In addition to explicating generalizable principles and heuristics, this requires an 170 
emphasis on understanding individual differences, the role of the environment, and the 171 
wider socio-cultural and political contexts in which learning takes place. 172 
Here we first explicate the need for a theoretical framework to allow linking 173 
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different levels of explanation that can be considered under educational neuroscience. We 174 
present a multi-level theoretical and methodological framework for educational 175 
neuroscience. The framework incorporates levels of explanation and methodologies both 176 
from education and brain sciences. The purpose is to contribute to discussions on the major 177 
goals of educational neuroscience as a field, discuss which approaches can provide the 178 
ground for a fruitful transdisciplinary fusion of ideas and methods from relevant fields, and 179 
propose a theoretical scaffold that can amalgamate the multiple levels of inquiry. To 180 
exemplify how an educational neuroscience study that spans across multiple levels would 181 
look like, we present a research program on moral psychology and education, involving 182 
multiple studies spanning across the different levels of analysis presented. 183 
Educational neuroscience is often characterized as a bridge between neuroscience 184 
and education [14]. This metaphor implies that educational neuroscience is a space where 185 
researchers and practitioners from two fields interact, but not a field with its own vision, 186 
community of researchers, big questions, theoretical frameworks, and methodologies. 187 
Alternatively, educational neuroscience can be characterized as a new field that fills the gap 188 
between brain sciences and education [15]. This metaphor implies a burgeoning, 189 
transdisciplinary field, in close contact with other relevant fields, but with its own big 190 
questions, theories, methodologies and community of researchers. In its current state, the 191 
bridge metaphor is a better characterization of educational neuroscience. However, the fast-192 
paced progression of the field poses a future vision that better matches the “filling the gap” 193 
metaphor. However, before this can happen, big questions for the field, theoretical 194 
paradigms, and methodologies need to emerge.  195 
There are two main characteristics of educational neuroscience that distinguish it 196 
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from other fields within brain science. First, the purpose of educational neuroscience is not 197 
only to understand the brain mechanisms that underlie learning and cognition, but also to 198 
study how learning happens in authentic contexts and to design learning environments and 199 
programs based on what we know about learning. This requires incorporation of research 200 
paradigms from different fields of education and brain sciences.  201 
Secondly, even though the name "educational neuroscience" implies an emphasis 202 
on neural-level investigations, educational neuroscience should be characterized as a 203 
transdisciplinary field that incorporates multiple methodologies and levels of explanation 204 
from both educational and brain science research. The main goal should not be to push for 205 
neural level explanations or neuroscience methodologies as alternatives to established 206 
paradigms in education. Instead, the goal is to explore how existing paradigms of 207 
educational research can be complemented with paradigms in brain sciences to provide 208 
more comprehensive, multi-level explanations for how learning occurs. These diverse levels 209 
of explanation, i.e., socio-cultural, first-person, behavioral, cognitive, evolutionary, neural, 210 
physiological, and genetic (Fig. 1), are grounded in different research traditions, some of 211 
them in education, others in cognitive and brain sciences. Educational neuroscience faces 212 
the challenge of theoretically connecting these levels to provide coherent multi-level 213 
explanations for learning and inform educational practice and policy. One difficulty here is 214 
the lack of a shared lingua across people from different fields and paradigms. There is a need for 215 
a theoretical framework that is operationalized across all these levels that can act as the basis that 216 
can bring together these levels.  217 
Multiple Levels & Diverse Methodologies in Educational Neuroscience 218 
After Marr’s influential work on distinct levels of analysis for information 219 
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processing systems [16], it became common to approach cognition as a complex system 220 
that has multiples levels of organization [17]. Marr introduced three levels, computational, 221 
algorithmic, and implementation. The computational level describes the processes and 222 
operations conducted by the system, and sub-tasks involved in each. However, it does not 223 
describe how the system does these operations. The computational level is about what the 224 
system does, but not about how it does it. The algorithmic level includes formal 225 
representations for the processes at the computational level. This level explicates how the 226 
system performs the operations described in the computational level. The implementation 227 
(or physical) level involves the physical mechanism where the computation is performed, 228 
whether it is biological, silicon-based, or any other form of hardware.  229 
Given that approaching cognition as a computational phenomenon became 230 
ubiquitous starting with the cognitive revolution in the 1950s, Marr’s levels of analysis for 231 
information processing systems in general, highly impacted our approach to cognition. 232 
However, the human cognitive system hardly presents an ideal match for the levels 233 
described in Marr’s work. Marr proposed that these three levels can be analyzed 234 
independently; that we don’t need to understand algorithms to study computations, and 235 
likewise we don’t need to understand the implementation level to make sense of 236 
algorithms. While the argument for independence neatly applies to computational systems 237 
(i.e., the same algorithm can run on many different forms of hardware), its application to 238 
human cognition and neuroscience is problematic. Churchland and Sejnowski [18] argued 239 
that “the independence that Marr emphasized pertained only to the formal properties of 240 
algorithms, not to how they might be discovered” (pg. 742). There is no distinct, 241 
independent, and inherent algorithmic level in human cognition. The cognitive models we 242 
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develop are mathematical formalisms describing the working principles of a system. The 243 
development of these models relies on studying the implementation (physical) level; 244 
biological and neural systems. Churchland and Sejnowski [18] proposed a model for 245 
structural levels of organization in the nervous system (from micro to macro scale), which 246 
involves molecules, synapses, neurons, networks, maps, systems, and the central nervous 247 
system. They argued that “it is difficult if not impossible to theorize effectively on these 248 
matters [related to nature of cognition] in the absence of neurobiological constraints.” (pg. 249 
744) and that understanding cognition requires connecting these interrelated, non-250 
independent levels. 251 
Educational neuroscience, like cognitive neuroscience, seeks to understand how 252 
biological mechanisms support cognition. In addition, educational neuroscience focuses on 253 
how we should design learning environments based on what we know about human 254 
cognition. We argue that approaching cognition as a complex system that should be studied 255 
in distinct but interrelated levels is applicable to educational neuroscience as well. 256 
However, given the applied and contextual nature of educational neuroscience, we propose 257 
alternative levels of analysis that captures both biological and socio-cultural aspects of 258 
educational neuroscience. Filling the gap between education and brain sciences, 259 
educational neuroscience concerns levels of explanation and inquiry from both domains. 260 
In Fig. 1, a characterization of these levels – from socio-cultural to genetic –  is presented. 261 
Each level of explanation feeds from a different set of fields. For example, socio-cultural 262 
theories of learning abound in education, whereas neural and cognitive-level explanations 263 
are inherent to cognitive neuroscience. Here we present a short description of each level, 264 
proposed as part of the multi-level framework.  265 
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Socio-cultural level 266 
At the sociocultural level, learning is defined as a situated activity taking place in a 267 
socio-cultural context [19]. At this level, research on learning is conducted using design-268 
based research [20], and a wide range of other qualitative methodologies. According to 269 
situated theories, learning occurs as a result of situated activity in authentic contexts. This 270 
is the most ecologically valid level of inquiry. 271 
First-person level 272 
The inquiries at this level concern the direct experience of learners, reported by the 273 
learners themselves. It is closely related to the phenomenological tradition (e.g., [21]). This 274 
is a level commonly ignored by psychological and brain sciences, unlike education, where 275 
the learners’ first-person experience is one of the main foci of study. Interviews, think-276 
aloud activities, journals are some of the commonly used methods to study first-person 277 
experience. There are also some non-mainstream approaches in brain sciences that explore 278 
how first-person experience can guide neural-level investigations (e.g., 279 
neurophenomenology [22, 23]).  280 
Behavioral level 281 
Behavioral studies focus on measuring learning and studying cognitive processes 282 
through observable behavioral indicators (e.g., reaction time, accuracy). There is an 283 
established tradition of behavioral science in psychology. Cognitive models are often 284 
assessed based on their ability to predict and model human behavioral performance. 285 
Behavioral data also accompanies and guides analysis of neuroimaging data in cognitive 286 
neuroscience studies.  287 
Cognitive level 288 
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Cognitive level involves study of mental processes (e.g., memory, attention, 289 
perception). An important focus at this level is developing mathematical / computational 290 
models of cognition and learning. Based on an information processing approach [24], 291 
cognition is characterized as processing inputs (perception) to produce outputs (action), 292 
instead of simply responding to stimuli (behaviorism). Cognitivism distinguishes between 293 
perception and action, as well as emotion and cognition. The cognitivist paradigm is strong 294 
in psychology and most cognitive neuroscience research target unfolding the neural 295 
correlates of the processes at the cognitive level.  296 
Neural and Physiological level 297 
Perhaps, neural level explanations are the ones most emphasized in discussions 298 
about educational neuroscience. With fast-paced developments in neuroimaging 299 
technologies since the 1990s, neural level investigations are pioneering psychological and 300 
brain sciences [25]. A wide range of methodologies is available to researchers (e.g., fMRI, 301 
Electroencephalography (EEG) / Event-Related Potentials (ERP), 302 
Magnetoencephalography (MEG), and functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS)). 303 
One shortcoming is the lack of ecological validity of most studies conducted at the neural 304 
level. Because there are a wide range of constraints limiting the tasks participants can 305 
engage with, cognitive neuroscience investigations often can’t use authentic tasks or take 306 
place in authentic environments. This is currently a major challenge for educational 307 
neuroscience. However there is a growing body of literature reporting results and new 308 
methods that aim at conducting ecologically valid neural-level investigations ( see [26, 309 
27]). 310 
The physiological level refers to biological processes that are not considered a 311 
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direct part of the central nervous system. These include measures like heart rate, cortisol 312 
level, and, electrodermal response (galvanic skin response). These measures are good 313 
indirect measures of the mental and emotional states of the participants in certain task 314 
conditions. They are often used in psychology and, especially in affective and social 315 
neuroscience studies. Physiological measures are promising in studying student motivation 316 
and affect during learning in authentic contexts. 317 
Evolutionary level 318 
Evolutionary explanations for human cognitive abilities often help make 319 
connections among different cognitive faculties that would not be obvious otherwise. 320 
Studies at this level either concern research on anthropological evidence on how human 321 
cognitive abilities evolved or comparative studies with non-human animals. Evolutionary 322 
psychology is an important subfield of psychology and comparative neuroscience studies 323 
with non-human animals, particularly primates, support inferences about the evolution of 324 
human brain and cognition. 325 
Genetic level 326 
Genetic level concerns how genetic markers interact with learning abilities and 327 
performance. Research at this level mainly focuses on understanding cognitive and 328 
behavioral disorders, how genetic dispositions affect learning and how we can develop 329 




Figure 1. Levels of analysis for educational neuroscience. 333 
Challenges 334 
Authentic tasks 335 
Most of the tasks students are engaged in in the classroom are highly complex 336 
compared to the tasks traditionally used in experimental research. This makes traditional 337 
experimental paradigms unsuitable for studying authentic learning processes in the 338 
classroom. Experimental research requires averaging of data (both behavioral and neural) 339 
collected across many trials. Experimental research also controls for the sequencing of 340 
trials from different conditions to control for priming effects. Both averaging of many trials 341 
of data across conditions and controlling for priming effects are difficult to do when 342 
studying an authentic task (both in the lab and in the classroom). In authentic tasks the 343 
sequencing of events can be a dependent factor. The learners might follow different 344 
trajectories during a task. These trajectories might be informed by individual differences 345 
and can be a valuable source of data. Nevertheless, the more complex and uncontrollable 346 
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nature of authentic tasks makes averaging and controlling for confounds difficult. 347 
Authentic contexts 348 
The major shortcoming of experimental lab studies for education is the lack of 349 
ecological validity. Learning takes place in dynamic, unpredictable and complex 350 
environments, such as the classroom. One aspect of this complexity is the rich social 351 
interactions taking place. A second one is related to physical situatedness; diverse forms of 352 
physical interactions taking place that wouldn’t be possible in the lab environment. 353 
Authentic contexts are not conducive to experimental research both because random 354 
sampling is usually not an option (e.g., in school contexts), and neuroimaging and 355 
electrophysiological methods are hard to use in authentic contexts due to high-level noise 356 
induced by the dynamic environment, in addition to other practical contexts. However, 357 
there have been efforts in overcoming these difficulties, where, for example, EEG [29] and 358 
fNIRS [30] studies were conducted in not strictly controlled classroom contexts. 359 
Relating levels 360 
Relating the previously discussed levels of inquiry is a challenge. Each level comes 361 
with a baggage of theoretical perspectives, research methodologies and “academic silos” 362 
separating the fields that each level is grounded in. There is need for a theoretical scaffold 363 
that can connect these levels. This theoretical scaffold should be able to accommodate 364 
explanations on how learning takes place across each level and integrate them to provide a 365 
coherent, multi-level explanation for learning and cognition. Because the levels of inquiry 366 
presented originate from different fields, there are also a wide range of theoretical 367 
perspectives presented. For example, the cognitive level is dominated by cognitivist 368 
theories, while the first-person level is closer to phenomenological traditions. As Marr 369 
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famously observed, “Trying to understand perception by studying only neurons is like 370 
trying to understand bird flight by studying only feathers: It just cannot be done” [16]. The 371 
same is true for understanding bird flight through pure observational and behavioral data. 372 
In the same vein, learning in authentic contexts can be fully understood only through a 373 
combination of methodologies and perspectives. 374 
Research Design 375 
Currently research that targets combining neuroscience and education approaches 376 
generally is more biased towards using neuroscience research methodologies to answer 377 
some of the previously unanswered questions in education. For example imaging studies 378 
on dyslexia have provided new insights on the neural mechanisms that underlie dyslexia, 379 
which then informed learning interventions that help address early phonological processing 380 
impairments [31]. However, implications of cognitive neuroscience studies informing 381 
educational design and practice does not fully exemplify the emergence of a 382 
transdisciplinary research field, connecting the aforementioned levels. Here we review 383 
various research design approaches that incorporate perspectives, paradigms and research 384 
methodology from education and neuroscience. These methodologies represent various 385 
degrees of integration between the two fields, some of them tilting towards neuroscience, 386 
others towards education, and some representing a further form of integration. The 387 
methodological approaches listed below are not mutually exclusive and most studies 388 
employ more than one of these approaches. 389 
Types of Research Design 390 
Pre-test, intervention, post-test. This form of design allows for using authentic 391 
tasks in the intervention stage with only behavioral data collection, and using more 392 
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traditional neuroimaging methods during the pre/post-test stages. The data analysis focuses 393 
on changes from the pre-test to post-test period as a result of the intervention. The 394 
intervention can be an authentic task in the lab or a classroom activity. 395 
Classroom studies. Classroom studies involve collection of different forms of data 396 
using methodologies typically used in the lab. These can include, for example, EEG, eye-397 
tracking, and interaction-logging. These forms of studies involve both authentic tasks and 398 
authentic contexts. Multiple studies have used EEG and fNIRS during classroom sessions 399 
[e.g., 30][29]. Difficulties with marking events with high level of temporal accuracy, 400 
artifacts and noise due to a wide range of concurrent modes of processing and bodily 401 
movement, and the impossibility of controlling the stimuli and sequencing of events in the 402 
complex classroom environment are some challenges. 403 
Lab studies with authentic tasks. An authentic task is characterized by natural 404 
ways of interaction, where the sequencing of events is not pre-determined and one where 405 
the interactions afford a continuous experience, not interrupted by constraints typical to 406 
classical experimental designs (e.g., inter-trial intervals, short task trials targeting a single 407 
form cognitive processing). In this type of research design the primary goal is to overcome 408 
the lack of ecological validity in more traditional designs by using authentic tasks.  409 
Given the constraints inherent to the neuroimaging methods [32,33] neuroimaging 410 
studies often do not use authentic tasks. One exception to this is neuroimaging research on 411 
video games [26] and methodological heuristics acquired from this body of research can 412 
be implemented in other research using authentic tasks.  Previous neuroimaging research 413 
on video games has explored a wide range of phenomena including cognitive workload / 414 
mental effort, engagement / arousal, attention, spatial processing, emotion and motivation, 415 
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as well as agency and perspective-taking [26,34]. 416 
Individual differences 417 
 Higher interest in individual differences has previously been listed as one of the 418 
qualities that distinguishes educational research from brain and cognitive sciences research 419 
[35]. For educational studies, understanding how individual differences affect learning 420 
experience and performance is of primary importance. In brain and cognitive sciences, the 421 
primary goal is usually to explore large patterns that characterize a sample, and individual 422 
differences, when investigated, are usually of secondary importance. 423 
In an ideal world we would be able to conduct both ecologically valid and 424 
reproducible studies and develop learning theories encompassing all of the levels of 425 
analysis. In a less ideal world, our investigations and theories incorporate at least a large 426 
subset of these levels. However, most research explicitly focus on how learning occurs at 427 
one given level. One reason for this is the methodological difficulty of collecting and 428 
analyzing data at each level to develop a theory that relates all these levels. For example, 429 
ERP research requires collecting many trials of data for the same condition to reliably study 430 
the effect of a manipulation on a specific component [36]. In addition, EEG/ERP data 431 
collection requires subjects to be relatively steady, and even limit the most natural actions 432 
like eye-blinking, or head movements. These constraints make it hard to design authentic 433 
tasks, which would improve ecological validity. In addition, the lab environment is 434 
artificial and does not provide an authentic socio-cultural context. As mentioned before, 435 
there are attempts to overcome these challenges by using authentic tasks and using mobile 436 
neuroimaging devices to collect data in authentic environments, like classrooms. [37–39]. 437 
There are also some efforts in using participants’ reported first-person experience as a 438
 21 
guide, while analyzing behavioral and neural data [23,40]. These are promising efforts that 439 
are yet to mature and perhaps will become mainstream research methodologies in the 440 
future. 441 
Both, the authenticity of the socio-cultural context as well as learners’ first-person 442 
experiences, are typically highly prioritized in educational research. In brain sciences, 443 
notions like reproducibility of empirical investigations, reliability and validity, and power 444 
of statistical results are important. These priorities reflect different epistemological 445 
assumptions and methodological constraints. Educational neuroscience is in need of 446 
finding a meeting ground that can accommodate these differences, even when some 447 
compromises are made. In the current state of things educational neuroscience sometimes 448 
acts as a platform, where brain scientists share what they know about the brain and 449 
cognition with educators and discuss implications. This was previously called the “one-450 
way model”. The desirable mode of interaction is one where there is a two-way 451 
communication [7,11]. The benefits of a multi-level approach extend beyond the scientific 452 
merits of investigating a phenomenon. It can also make findings about learning and 453 
cognition more accessible to application-based fields and stakeholders without 454 
compromising the science behind it. 455 
The multi-level perspective empowers educators and acknowledges the fact that 456 
educational neuroscience is not a colonization of the educational landscape by knowledge 457 
and methodologies from neuroscience and other mediating disciplines, but rather various 458 
fields coming together to yield to the emergence of a new field, situated in between, where 459 
perspectives, methodologies and levels of explanation from each originating field is valued 460 
and used. To facilitate our understanding on how the multi-level aspects of educational 461 
 22 
neuroscience can contribute to the improvement in education in the reality, we review 462 
previous studies that have attempted to connect the different levels and methodologies. In 463 
particular, we focus on a case in the field of moral education as a concrete example. The 464 
reviewed studies include previous meta-analyses and fMRI studies related to moral 465 
functioning, intervention studies inspired by the findings from the aforementioned 466 
neuroimaging studies, and computer simulations to model policy-level activities based on 467 
small-scale findings. We review these studies in order to exemplify how the multi-level 468 
approach can be implemented in educational neuroscience. 469 
Utilizing Neuroscientific Methods in Educational Contexts 470 
In this section, we reviewed how the proposed conceptual framework for 471 
educational neuroscience can be implemented with a concrete example in moral education. 472 
We decided to delve into the case of moral education, because the application of 473 
neuroscientific methods would be particularly beneficial for moral education among 474 
various fields in education. Because studies in moral psychology and moral education have 475 
focused on one of the most philosophically and conceptually sophisticated nature of human 476 
psychology, that is, morality, it would be significantly more susceptible to social 477 
desirability bias compared to other domains of human psychology. For instance, people 478 
might pretend to become a morally better person when they are participating in survey or 479 
observation studies examining moral development. As a result, moral psychologists and 480 
educators have tried to develop more sophisticated surveys and tests to minimize the 481 
possibility of such social desirability bias [41]. Given this, neuroscientific methods can 482 
potentially contribute to the expansion of our knowledge regarding how human morality is 483 
functioning with biological evidence by providing us more directly research methods that 484 
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are less susceptible to the social desirability bias [42–44]. In order to see how 485 
neuroscientific studies can contribute to moral education in practice, as the first step in this 486 
process, we consider two specific methods, i.e., meta-analysis and fMRI methods, which 487 
can illuminate psychological processes involved in moral functioning, as components in 488 
the research program of educational neuroscience. 489 
First, a meta-analysis of previous neuroimaging studies can identify which 490 
psychological processes are commonly involved in order to target psychological 491 
functioning that will be influenced by educational interventions. Clearly identifying such 492 
psychological processes and mechanisms is essential for designing effective interventions 493 
[45]. A meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies is a feasible option for identifying such 494 
psychological processes while also providing us with a direct and statistically-valid way to 495 
examine internal neural-level psychological processes. A meta-analysis can also address 496 
several issues associated with traditional neuroimaging methods, such as the lack of 497 
statistical power originating from relatively small sample sizes, idiosyncrasies in 498 
experimental designs [46–48] and possibility of erroneous reverse inference in 499 
interpretation [49]. In case of the present example of moral education, a meta-analysis of 500 
previously conducted neuroimaging studies can identify common activation foci of interest 501 
in moral functioning. For the meta-analysis of previous neuroimaging studies, the 502 
activation likelihood estimation (ALE) implemented by Ginger ALE is one of the most 503 
valid and feasible analysis methods [50,51]. While systematic or qualitative review 504 
methods are also possible in a meta-analysis, ALE is a quantitative method that provides 505 
us with empirical evidence pertaining to psychological processes of interest with statistical 506 
validity.  507 
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Previous meta-analyses of neuroimaging studies focusing on moral functioning 508 
using Ginger ALE have demonstrated common activation foci associated with moral 509 
psychological processes [52–55]. However, the research questions and hypotheses of these 510 
meta-analyses were not based on theories of moral development and moral education, so 511 
their developmental, psychological, and educational implications for educational 512 
neuroscientific studies are limited. A recent meta-analysis, however, designed its analytic 513 
framework and hypotheses [56] based on the Neo-Kohlbergian perspective, a mainstream 514 
moral psychological theory that has been applied in moral educational programs in diverse 515 
domains, such as professional ethics programs [57,58]. This study reported that brain 516 
regions associated with self-related processes, particularly autobiographical self and self-517 
evaluation – the default mode network (DMN) and cortical midline structures (CMS) 518 
including the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) and posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) –  519 
were commonly activated across diverse morality-related task conditions (see Figure 2). 520 
Given these results, selfhood might be commonly engaged in moral functioning. fMRI and 521 
intervention experiments can be guided by these findings; they may focus on self-related 522 
psychological processes while setting their research questions and experimental designs. 523 
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 524 
Figure 2. Common activation foci of moral functioning, including the MPFC and 525 
PCC, found by the meta-analysis. 526 
Second, we can conduct an fMRI experiment that is designed to examine the neural 527 
correlates of psychological processes of interest, e.g., moral motivation, based on the 528 
findings from meta-analyses. Such an fMRI experiment can show us more specified neural-529 
level processes and mechanisms of interest by employing customized experimental 530 
designs, while meta-analyses are only able to show us the neural correlates of such 531 
processes and mechanisms in general. In the case of moral psychology, previous fMRI 532 
experiments have demonstrated the neural correlates of moral functioning by employing 533 
diverse experimental paradigms [59,60]. These studies have shown that various brain 534 
regions associated with cognitive [61,62], affective [63–65], motivational [66,67], and self-535 
related processes [60,68] were activated in moral task conditions. 536 
Particularly informative is a recent fMRI experiment with a set of hypotheses based 537 
on findings from the previous meta-analysis that showed significance of self-related 538 
processes in moral functioning [69]. Although several previous fMRI studies have 539 
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demonstrated the activation of self-related regions [60,68], they were mainly interested in 540 
identifying activation foci themselves, but not how self-related psychological processes 541 
moderated moral functioning at the neural level. Instead, the recently conducted fMRI 542 
experiment investigated how brain regions associated with selfhood, the DMN and CMN, 543 
moderated activity in other brain regions associated with moral emotion and motivation, 544 
such as the insula, while solving moral problems by utilizing the psychophysiological 545 
interaction analysis [70] and Granger causality analysis methods [71]. Figure 3 546 
demonstrates the results of these analyses. As hypothesized, the analysis indicated that 547 
neural activity in regions associated with selfhood in the DMN and CMS, particularly the 548 
MPFC and PCC, significantly moderated activity in moral emotion and moral motivation-549 
related regions, as well as the insula which has been known to assist brain regions in the 550 
generation of appropriate behavioral responses to salient stimuli [72]. Consequently, this 551 
fMRI experiment was able to support hypotheses based upon previously published 552 
neuroimaging studies of morality and their meta-analyses, and identify psychological 553 




Figure 3. Brain regions moderated by the MPFC and PCC, including the insula, in 557 
moral task conditions. Left: regions moderated by the MPFC. Right: regions moderated by 558 
the PCC. 559 
Psychological Intervention Methods Founded by Neuroscientific Studies 560 
Before applying findings from the neuroimaging studies to moral education in 561 
practice, we have to test whether the prototype of educational programs targeting the 562 
psychological processes are identified by neuroimaging studies. It can be tested by 563 
conducting relatively small-scale psychological intervention experiments. Such 564 
intervention experiments can be an interface between neuroscience and education in 565 
practice by providing evidence for a certain intervention that is designed based on findings 566 
from neuroscientific studies. As a concrete example in the field of moral education, 567 
educational interventions utilizing the stories of moral exemplars are considered hereafter. 568 
Interventions based on psychology, particularly social and educational psychology, 569 
have improved students’ academic achievement and social adjustment in diverse 570 
educational settings [73–77]. Thus, such psychological intervention methods can provide 571 
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useful insights about how to design more effective moral education programs. Basically, 572 
psychological interventions are designed to tweak psychological processes that are 573 
fundamentally associated with a targeted developmental outcome [45]. Hence, it would be 574 
necessary to design educational interventions based on findings from psychological 575 
experiments successfully identifying which psychological processes are correlated with 576 
educational and development outcomes that will be targeted by the interventions. 577 
In traditional moral education, the stories of moral exemplars have been widely 578 
utilized in educational settings. Moral educators and parents have presented the stories of 579 
moral exemplars, who did morally great behaviors, in order to promote children’s moral 580 
motivation by encouraging them to emulate the presented moral behaviors [78,79]. The 581 
presentation of moral exemplars can promote motivation to engage in moral behavior 582 
through vicarious social learning [80], moral elevation [81,82], and upward social 583 
comparison [83,84]. However, the mere presentation of moral exemplars can backfire 584 
when social and moral psychological mechanisms are not carefully considered. 585 
Particularly, when extreme moral exemplars, such as historic moral figures (e.g., Mother 586 
Teresa) that have usually been introduced in moral education textbooks, are presented, 587 
students might feel negative emotional responses, such as extreme envy and resentment, 588 
and tend not to emulate presented moral behaviors [85,86]. During the presentation of such 589 
extreme exemplars, students might think that the presented moral behaviors are not 590 
emulatable given their ability, and might activate the self-defense mechanism protecting 591 
their selfhood by isolating them from moral values to deal with the negative emotional 592 
responses [85,87,88]. Thus, it is necessary to carefully examine psychological processes 593 
associated with interventions in order to make the interventions more effective while 594 
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minimizing possible negative outcomes. 595 
As a concrete example, we reviewed an intervention study consisting of two moral 596 
educational intervention experiments. These two psychological intervention experiments 597 
used the stories of moral exemplars and tested which type of exemplary stories better 598 
promoted motivation to engage in moral activity [89]. In order to determine which 599 
psychological processes were targeted and tweaked during intervention experiments, 600 
findings from aforementioned neuroimaging studies, a meta-analysis and fMRI study, were 601 
reviewed. These neuroimaging studies have demonstrated that brain regions associated 602 
with self-related psychological processes, particularly autobiographical memory 603 
processing, were commonly involved in moral functioning in general [56], and moderated 604 
moral emotion and motivation [69]. Given such findings from the previous neuroimaging 605 
experiments, intervention experiments manipulated the perceived distance between 606 
presented moral exemplars and participants’ self-concept.  607 
Two intervention experiments, one lab experiment and one classroom experiment, 608 
that were founded by the neuroimaging studies were conducted. The experiments presented 609 
two different types of exemplary stories: attainable and unattainable moral stories. Given 610 
the significant positive interaction between self-related and moral functioning-related brain 611 
regions, as the presented moral stories are perceived to be closely associated with 612 
participants’ self-concept, the motivating effect of the stories would become greater [90]; 613 
attainable stories (e.g., stories of peer exemplars) would more strongly promote motivation 614 
compared to unattainable stories (e.g., stories of historic figures), which seem distant from 615 
participants. In fact, previous social psychological intervention experiments focusing on 616 
non-moral motivation also reported that attainable stories better promoted motivation while 617 
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unattainable stories might backfire [91,92].  618 
A lab experiment was conducted to examine the motivating effects of different 619 
types of moral stories among college students; it used engagement in voluntary service 620 
activities as a proxy for moral motivation [89]. A total of 54 college students participated 621 
in this experiment. Their pre- and post-test voluntary service engagement were measured. 622 
The participants were randomly assigned to one of these three groups: attainable, 623 
unattainable, and control groups. On the one hand, attainable group members were 624 
presented with the stories of youth exemplars who participated in a reasonable amount of 625 
service activities (≤ 2 hours per week). On the other hand, participants in the unattainable 626 
group were presented with the exemplary stories of extreme service engagement (≥ 10 627 
hours per week). The control group was presented with non-moral stories, such as general 628 
sports news reports. After presenting attainable or unattainable moral stories to the 629 
participants, their post-test voluntary service engagement was surveyed once again eight 630 
week later to examine change in engagement. Findings demonstrated that participants 631 
assigned to the attainable group showed significantly greater increase in the service 632 
engagement compared to other groups (see Figure 4). 633 
 634 
Figure 4. Changes in engagement rate in each condition in the lab experiment. Left: 635 
engagement rate quantified in hours. Right: engagement rate quantified in percentage. 636 
In addition, a classroom intervention experiment tested the same hypothesis among 637 
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107 8th graders [89]. This classroom-level experiment was performed to apply the lab-level 638 
intervention to more realistic educational settings. Similar to the previous lab experiment, 639 
the participants were assigned to one of these two groups: peer exemplar and historic figure 640 
groups. On the one hand, the peer exemplar group was asked to present and discuss moral 641 
virtues and behaviors done by peer exemplars, such as friends, teachers, and family 642 
members, that deemed to be attainable. On the other hand, participants assigned to the 643 
historic figure group were requested to talk about moral virtues and behaviors of historic 644 
moral exemplars, such as Mother Teresa and Martin Luther King, that seemed to be 645 
extraordinary and unattainable to them. Interventions were conducted for once a week for 646 
an hour during eight weeks. Participants’ service engagement was measured before the 647 
beginning of the intervention period and twelve weeks after the pre-test survey. 648 
Participants’ answers were quantified on a one to five scale (“1. None”— “5. More than 649 
once per week”). Survey results demonstrated that the positive change in service 650 
engagement in the peer exemplar group was significantly greater compared to the historic 651 
figure group (see Figure 5). 652 
 653 
Figure 5. Changes in service engagement in each condition in the classroom 654 
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experiment. 655 
The findings from these two experiments supported the hypothesis that was 656 
founded by the previous neuroimaging studies. Attainable exemplars better promoted 657 
moral motivation compared to unattainable exemplars. These findings are coherent with 658 
the neuroimaging experiments that showed the moderating effect of self-related 659 
psychological processes on moral emotion and moral motivation. Consequently, we shall 660 
conclude that our conceptual framework pertaining to how to utilize neuroscience in 661 
educational practice has been supported by the presented example case, moral educational 662 
interventions based on neuroimaging studies of moral functioning. 663 
Applying Evolutionary Modeling and Computer Simulation to Inform 664 
Educators and Policy Makers 665 
Although we have demonstrated that it would be possible to design more effective 666 
educational interventions based on findings from neuroimaging studies, how to apply such 667 
educational interventions at the large scale, such as at the school or district level, is still 668 
unclear. Because findings from the aforementioned intervention experiments, lab and 669 
classroom experiments, might only be valid at a relatively small scale (lab or classroom 670 
level), these findings cannot be generalized without any further investigations. Because 671 
even a brief educational intervention might produce long-term developmental outcomes 672 
among students [73,93], we should carefully consider how to properly predict long-term, 673 
large-scale outcomes of interventions based on available evidence, such as, evidence from 674 
relatively small-scale intervention experiments. However, due to the lack of time and 675 
resource, it is difficult to conduct multiple long-term, large-scale experiments in real 676 
educational settings to examine such outcomes in reality [94,95]. 677 
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Computer simulation methods can address this limitation by enabling researchers 678 
and educators to perform these predictions accurately, and thereby, provide basic 679 
information regarding how to scale-up designed interventions. Particularly, simulation 680 
methods based on evolutionary modeling [96] and deep learning [97] might be feasible 681 
methodologies to conduct such predictions. As a part of the conceptual framework of 682 
educational neuroscience, these methodologies could also be included because even though 683 
they originated from parallel fields such as evolutionary biology, artificial intelligence, and 684 
artificial neural network modeling, they can contribute to interfacing neuroscience, 685 
education, and all other mediating disciplines in practice.  686 
First, evolutionary modeling using the Evolutionary Causal Matrices (ECM) can 687 
predict the future status of a certain system consisting of different types of individuals [98]. 688 
The ECM predict the future status at t0+n from the status change between t0 and t0+1 with 689 
iterative calculations; with n iterations, the predicted status at t0+n can be calculated [96]. 690 
In the case of the moral educational intervention, we can set the t0 status as the pre-test 691 
voluntary service engagement and t0+1 as the post-test engagement. By performing 692 
iterative calculations, we can compare the effectiveness of interventions according to their 693 
types and application frequencies. Due to the limitations of time and resource in 694 
educational intervention research, the majority of simulations might be performed for 695 
relatively short-term predictions; however, the theoretical framework of the simulation 696 
method can be applied in relatively long-term longitudinal predictions as well.  697 
For this simulation, findings from the aforementioned intervention experiments are 698 
revisited. In order to predict developmental outcomes of the moral exemplar-applied 699 
interventions, ECM were created using pre- and post-test service engagement data, and 700 
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iterative simulation processes were performed with the created ECM [99,100]. As 701 
presented in Table 1, ECM for simulations were created by comparing the ratio of 702 
participants who engaged in service activities at the pre- and post-test periods in each 703 
experimental condition. They demonstrate the transitions between statuses (engaging vs. 704 
not engaging) across two timepoints; for instance, participants were more likely to start or 705 
continue to engage in service activities in the attainable condition compared to the 706 
unattainable condition. Based on these ECM, long-term outcomes of the interventions were 707 
simulated through iterative learning processes with different intervention types and 708 
frequencies. As presented in Figure 6, the attainable exemplar-applied intervention can 709 
better promote engagement. Its effect size declines as the frequency of application gets 710 
lower (see Figure 7). Thus, the intervention should be performed at least once per every 711 
10.5 months to produce a large effect. We remark that the ECM-based prediction is useful 712 
at predicting future outcome sequences based on a simple stochastic model with a relatively 713 
small number of estimated parameters.  714 
    Engaging (t) Not engaging (t) 
Attainable condition 
Engaging (t+1) .90 (ECM [1,1,1]) .44 (ECM [1,1,2]) 
Not engaging (t+1) .10 (ECM [1,2,1]) .56 (ECM [1,2,2]) 
Unattainable condition 
Engaging (t+1) .64 (ECM [2,1,1]) .12 (ECM [2,1,2]) 
Not engaging (t+1) .36 (ECM [2,2,1]) .88 (ECM [2,2,2]) 
Without any intervention 
(control condition) 
Engaging (t+1) .71 (ECM [3,1,1]) .28 (ECM [3,1,2]) 
Not engaging (t+1) .29 (ECM [3,2,1]) .72 (ECM [3,2,2]) 
Table 1. Created ECM for different types of interventions 715 
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 716 
Figure 6. Change in the mean ratio of engagement with different intervention frequencies 717 
across different conditions.718 
 719 
Figure 7. The estimate effect size of the attainable exemplar-applied intervention per 720 
different intervention frequency. The red line indicates a threshold for a large effect size 721 
(partial h2 = .14, see [101]). 722 
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When a large enough amount of training data is on hand, one can apply machine 723 
learning algorithms in order to develop a data-driven prediction model. Furthermore, we 724 
might have to employ the machine learning method when multiple covariates, such as 725 
demographical variables, are required to be considered, because the ECM only allow us to 726 
predict outcomes solely based on one independent variable. Among various machine 727 
learning algorithms, artificial neural networks with many layers, or simply “deep learning”, 728 
is currently the most popular due to its outstanding performance in many classical 729 
applications such as image classification, object recognition, speech recognition, etc. The 730 
deep architecture of deep learning corresponds to a hierarchy of features, factors, or 731 
concepts, where higher-level concepts are defined from lower-level ones, and the same 732 
lower-level concepts can help define many higher-level concepts (Deng & Yu, 2014, p. 733 
200).  734 
In our example, the deep learning method was applied to the moral education 735 
intervention data. Using Google’s TensorFlow [102], a two-layered convolutional network, 736 
for predicting intervention outcomes, was trained (see Figure 8) [103]. The prediction 737 
network takes pre-test variables (i.e., service engagement, gender, intervention type, 738 
emotional responses to intervention activity, intention to engage in service) as inputs, and 739 
predicts the post-test outcome (i.e., whether or not to engage in service at the post-test). An 740 
iterative training algorithm (called the stochastic gradient method) was used during 741 
simulation. Findings reported that the prediction performance was maximized after about 742 
4,000 iterations of the training algorithm. 1  The best prediction model with the 743 
                                               
1  Note that the prediction performance decreases after a certain number of 
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convolutional network clearly outperformed simple logistic regression: while the accuracy 744 
of logistic regression was 75.47%, that of the best convolutional network reached 85.16% 745 
(see Table 2). Given these results, the deep learning method can enable researchers, 746 
educators, and policy makers to simulate and prototype large-scale intervention 747 
experiments or applications, particularly when multiple independent variables and 748 
covariates should be considered in a prediction. 749 
 750 
Figure 8. Illustrative example of a deep learning neural network 751 






                                               
iterations. This is called overfitting, which happens when a prediction model starts 
capturing in the model noise of the data, losing predictability. 
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8000 70.30% 
Table 2. Accuracy of TensorFlow simulation across different iterative learning 752 
conditions. Colored cells indicate the best accuracy outcome.  753 
Aforementioned computational methodologies, the ECM and deep learning, might 754 
be feasible and accurate ways to predict long-term, large-scale outcomes of educational 755 
interventions based on relatively small-scale data, e.g., lab- or classroom-level intervention 756 
experiment data. Findings from computer simulations might provide useful information 757 
regarding how to employ developed interventions and establish educational policies and 758 
procedures in diverse educational settings. Hence, these computational approaches can 759 
constitute a fundamental part in the conceptual framework of educational neuroscience that 760 
bridges the gap between neuroscience and education in practice. It is worth noting that 761 
integrating the different levels of analysis for a solution is constrained by the existing 762 
breadth of literature. Therefore, it may not be possible to incorporate evidence from all 763 
levels of analysis as seen in this moral education example (Fig. 9). 764 
 765 
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Figure 9. Application of the different levels of analysis within educational neuroscience in 766 
the context of the moral education example.  767 
Conclusions 768 
 As an emerging transdisciplinary area of research, educational neuroscience is 769 
facing challenges in formulating theoretical frameworks that can link and integrate 770 
perspectives, findings, and research methods from neuroscience, education, and other 771 
mediating disciplines. Here we first proposed a theoretical framework that integrated 772 
levels of analysis from various fields including education and neuroscience; then we 773 
discussed how educational neuroscience can examine learning and cognition across these 774 
levels, and provide new insights that could not be possible without crossing or integrating 775 
these levels. In the second part of the paper we presented a research program in moral 776 
psychology and ethics education as a case study for how educational neuroscience 777 
research can integrate findings and methods across multiple levels to address a set of 778 
shared, core research questions. We argue that educational neuroscience differs from 779 
cognitive neuroscience in that it concerns how learning takes places in authentic 780 
educational contexts; in addition to understanding the mechanisms of learning, it also 781 
strives to develop interventions and find evidence-based solutions to educational 782 
problems. This requires development of research methodologies that can allow the study 783 
of learning and cognition with authentic tasks and in authentic contexts.  When 784 
methodologies from various fields are integrated, this convergence can counter 785 
challenges by operating quickly and generating frequent data points to inform large-scale 786 
practice and policy decisions. Future efforts in educational neuroscience should address 787 
the challenge of developing theoretical tools and research methods that integrate different 788 
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levels of analysis that traditionally exist solely in education, neuroscience, or other siloed 789 
domains. And as these tools and methods gain momentum, there may also be a need for a 790 
shift in its label from educational neuroscience to a more inclusive term that truly depicts 791 
its transdisciplinary nature and integrative power to transform the landscape of learning. 792 
 793 
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